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Consider two different ways of characterizing the cognitive re-quirements necessary for perceptual awareness of an objectivephysical world.1 On the one hand, objective perceptual aware-
ness may only require the sensory capacity for awareness of particular
physical individuals and their features, perhaps along with the mini-
mal kinds of cognitive processing needed to integrate received sensory
information with behavior. On the other hand, objective perceptual
awareness may require not only these low-level cognitive capacities
but also conceptual capacities, or perhaps even specific concepts.2 Call
these two lines of thought regarding objective perpetual awareness
non-conceptualism and conceptualism respectively.
So long as we interpret the possession of concepts as requiring more
than the ability, on the part of the subject, to behaviorally discriminate
between individuals or kinds, the possibility arises that at least some
of the beings one might pre-theoretically be inclined to credit with an
objective perceptual awareness of their environment in fact lack the
cognitive capacities for such awareness. This is most apparent in the
higher non-human mammals (e.g. dogs, cats, dolphins, whales, etc.)
1. Quotations from Kant’s work are from the Akademie Ausgabe, with the first
Critique cited by the standard A/B edition pagination, and the other works
by volume and page. Translations are my own though I have regularly
consulted translations from the Hackett editions by Werner Pluhar and the
Cambridge Editions of the Works of Immanuel Kant, general editors Paul
Guyer and Allen Wood. Specific texts are abbreviated as follows:
An: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View
C: Correnspondence
FS: The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures
JL: Jäsche Logic
CPR: Critique of Pure Reason
CPJ: Critique of the Power of Judgment
Pr: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
LL: Lectures on Logic
LM: Lectures on Metaphysics
2. Tyler Burge makes a similar distinction, though his emphasis is on conditions
for representation rather than awareness. See Burge 2009, 2010.
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and in very young human children. Such beings are presumed to lack
concepts (though in the case of human infants this is perhaps more
controversial) and therefore must, according to the conceptualist, lack
the cognitive resources necessary for objective perceptual awareness.
For many, the problem of what to say regarding beasts and babes is a
major drawback of any view which would pin the capacity for objective
perceptual awareness on conceptual abilities.3
A diverse range of interpreters have regarded Kant as articulating
a conceptualist theory of objective perceptual awareness, in which the
mind plays an active role in constructing the empirical world of which
the subject is perceptually aware.4 Central to the constructive activity
of the mind is its discursive capacity to use concepts. Concepts, it is
said, are what allow the chaotic sensory material that forms the basis of
all conscious awareness to be organized into a framework that allows
a conscious subject an awareness of his environment. Moreover, it is
through the analysis of this conceptual framework that a subject can
have substantive a priori knowledge concerning universal and necessary
features of the physical world.5
According to this interpretive approach, Kant’s view is that a subject
is incapable of conscious awareness of the world around him unless he
has the capacity to exercise certain basic conceptual abilities. For exam-
ple, an advocate of Kantian conceptualism might argue that a subject
must possess the concept of a mind-independent substance, capable of
persisting through time if he is to have objective perceptual awareness of
3. See Bermudez 2003, 2007; Peacocke 2001 for discussion. For a clear instance
of how quickly one gets into difficulty regarding this issue see McDowell
1994, ch. 6. For further discussion of these issues with regard to representa-
tional capacities in humans and and a wide array of other animals see Burge
2010.
4. See, for example, Ginsborg 2006, 2007; Griffith 2010; Longuenesse 1998;
McDowell 1994, 1998; Pereboom 1988, 1995; Sellars 1967.
5. Lewis 1929 is a good example of this line of thought.
physical objects.6 Objective perceptual consciousness is thus understood
as dependent on a discursive capacity for the conceptual articulation of
what one perceives. A subject cannot be consciously aware of objects –
they cannot be presented to the consciousness of a subject – unless that
subject has at least the capacity to deploy concepts.7
The central purpose of the current paper is to examine the evidence
for thinking that Kant must deny non-discursive beings the capacity for
objective perceptual awareness by examining his remarks concerning
the cognitive capacities of non-human animals.8 I believe there is good
evidence that Kant attributed the capacity for objective perceptual
awareness to non-human animals, despite their lack of conceptual
capacities.9 I argue that Kant’s claims concerning animal representation
and consciousness do not themselves necessitate against attributing
to animals the capacity for objective perceptual consciousness, and
that a non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s position concerning
animals (and non-discursive beings more broadly) can actively endorse
this attribution. Kant can consistently allow that animals have a point of
view on the objective world which possesses a distinctive phenomenal
6. For an excellent recent discussion of philosophical views influenced by this
interpretation of Kant see Burge 2009; Burge 2010, ch. 6.
7. Recently, Tyler Burge has argued that such forms of conceptualism conflate
the cognitive capacity required for awareness of objects with the cognitive
capacity required for the awareness of the conditions of objectivity. See Burge
2009; Burge 2010, ch. 6, for criticism of such conflation. Laudably, Burge
does not attribute such a conflation of the two types of cognitive capacity (or
theories concerning such capacities) to Kant – just the opposite. See Burge
2010, pp. 154–6. I take the present paper to be broadly complimentary to
Burge’s line of thought.
8. I follow Kant in using the term “discursive” to encompass the sense of
“concept-applying.” Kant uses the notion of discursivity quite broadly, in-
cluding not only the application of concepts in judgment but also the broader
“synthetic” activity of mind in “running through and gathering together” the
various elements given in perception so that they may be thought (e.g. A99).
9. Burge makes a similar point concerning Kant’s views regarding representa-
tion. See Burge 2010, pp. 155–6.
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character while denying what seems most important to him – viz. that
animals have the capacity to take cognitive attitudes towards, and thus
self-ascribe, their own representational states.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First (§1), I distinguish two
different ways in which conceptualism might understand perceptual
awareness in non-discursive animals. According to the view I call
“sensory solipsism” non-discursive beings have a merely phenomenal
awareness that extends no further than their own subjective states.
According to the view I call “sensory nihilism” non-discursive beings
lack even phenomenal awareness of their own states. I then (§2) argue
that Kant attributes representational capacities to animals and examine
the different forms of conscious awareness that might come with this
attribution. Once several varieties of conscious awareness have been
distinguished I resolve a puzzle that arises in Kant’s discussions of
animal consciousness and inner sense (§3). Finally (§4), I articulate
an interpretation which distinguishes an animal’s capacity for inner
sense from its capacity for self-conscious introspection and argue that
the latter is not needed for an animal to have inner and outer sense,
and with those senses, both inner and outer intuitions. This, I argue, is
sufficient to credit animals with a primitive form of objective perceptual
awareness.
1. Two Forms of Conceptualism
The intellectualism inherent in the conceptualist thesis is problematic
when we consider two important classes of possibly (and plausibly)
sentient non-discursive beings – human infants and the ‘higher’ non-
human animals (e.g. whales, dolphins, apes, dogs, cats). There are two
options concerning conceptualism’s understanding of non-discursive
beings.10 The first option is that non-discursive beings are conscious
10. The notion of “non-discursive being” is limited here to finite beings. Kant’s
conception of God as an intuitive intellect entails that God is not a discursive
being. But this obviously does not commit Kant to thinking that God lacks
an objective awareness of His creations.
merely of their own sensations, which in the absence of rule-giving
conceptual articulation are liable to be experienced, in James’s memo-
rable phrase, as a “blooming, buzzing confusion.”11 On this first option,
beings lacking concepts nevertheless possess a form of experiential
consciousness. However, this form of consciousness is extremely primi-
tive, lacking any object-directed nature. All such conscious states are
thus purely subjective forms of awareness. They cannot be instances
of an awareness of physical particulars or their properties.12 This is
relatively easy to conceive of when concerning states such as feeling
hungry, tired, pain, pleasure, etc. It is somewhat more difficult perhaps
for color, texture, or movement sensations. Nevertheless, on this view,
all sensory presentation is limited to the subject’s own states. Hence,
on such a form of creature consciousness, there is an answer to the
question “what is it like to be that thing?” but such an answer will
not take the form of a specification of any object of which that thing is
aware. Call this form of conceptualism “sensory solipsism” concerning
non-discursive consciousness.13
11. With regard to James’s phrase, we need not understand the states of non-
discursive awareness as essentially confused. They may be perfectly orderly.
What they must essentially lack, according to this position, is any genuine
disclosure of an objective world.
12. See Strawson 1959/2003, p. 73 for Strawson’s characterization of a “true”
solipsist as “one who simply has no use for the distinction between himself
and what is not himself.” This is ambiguous between the claim that a true
solipsist lacks an awareness of an objective world, and the claim that the
solipsist lacks the capacity to articulate the conditions required to distinguish
between himself as subject and the world as object. The tendency to slide
from the latter to the former is present in much of the Strawson-influenced
literature on Kant. It also presumes that the cognitive nature of sensibility is
biased towards the subjective. For discussion see Burge 2010, pp. 162–3.
13. McDowell sometimes seems to endorse this position, as when he says, “Crea-
tures without conceptual capacities lack self-consciousness and – this is
part of the same package – experience of objective reality. I acknowledged
that this restriction raises a question about the perceptual capacities of
mere animals. Mere animals do not come within the scope of the Kantian
thesis, since they do not have the spontaneity of the understanding. . . It
follows that mere animals cannot enjoy ‘outer experience,’ on the concep-
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Alternatively, the proponent of conceptualism might take the second
option, and entirely deny to non-discursive beings the capacities for
both objective perceptual awareness and mere sensory awareness. It
is important to note that an proponent of this second position need
not deny non-discursive creatures a capacity to respond to their envi-
ronment. Non-discursive beings can be in states that causally covary
with their environments, allowing them to successfully interact in ways
conducive to their survival and reproductive success. Phototropic plant
life might feasibly count as instancing such causally covarying states of
their environment. We might also count insect life and micro-organisms
as presented with their environments without any form of conscious-
ness, though, especially in the case of insects, this is controversial.
But, according to this second option, such primitive representational
capacities are insufficient for even primitive phenomenal awareness
of a subject’s environment. Call this form of conceptualism “sensory
nihilism” concerning non-discursive consciousness.14
tion of ‘outer experience’ I have recommended.” (McDowell 1994, p. 114).
This is further supported by his remark that, “Perceptual sensitivity to the
environment [which non-discursive animals possess] need not amount to
awareness of the outer world” (Ibid., p. 119.) Hannah Ginsborg appears to
endorse a similar position, in that she grants a determinate phenomenology
to pre-conceptualized sense impressions, but denies that there is any repre-
sentational content present in such impressions. See Ginsborg 2006, p. 96,
and p. 104, note 43.
14. Some of McDowell’s remarks suggest that he actually holds this more ex-
treme position. He says, “the potential embarrassment I have been discussing
[that animals lack conceptual capacities] does not stop with the denial that
mere animals have ‘outer experience.’ They cannot have ’inner experience’
either, on the conception of ‘inner experience’ I have recommended. This
generates a parallel worry that I am obliterating their sentience." (McDowell
1994, p. 119.). His attempt to avoid this disconcerting conclusion is somewhat
perplexing. He says, “nothing in the concepts of pain or fear implies that
they can get a grip only where there is understanding, and thus full-fledged
subjectivity. There is no reason to suppose that they can be applied in a
non-first-person way only to something capable of applying them to itself
in a first-person way” (Ibid., pp. 120–1). It is not clear here which of two
positions McDowell is making room for. On the first he admits to denying
animals the capacity for representational states while arguing that they may
It seems fairly uncontroversial that Kant believed non-human ani-
mals incapable of conceptual capacities, and thus of discursive thought.
Hence, any attribution of objective perceptual consciousness to non-
human animals (hereafter “animals”) will only be possible given the
resources of Sensibility [Sinnlichkeit] alone. If the conceptualist inter-
pretation of Kant is correct then he too must accept either one of these
two positions concerning the nature of animal consciousness.15 Though
opinion is divided as to which of the two views he shares, most com-
mentators agree that Kant’s views on animal consciousness must be
limited to one of these two options.16 Here, I hope to show that Kant’s
views concerning animal consciousness do not entail either of these
positions. There is thus space for a Kantian position which recognizes
the possibility of objective conscious awareness in non-rational animals
that is perceptual without being essentially conceptual in nature.
nevertheless possess qualitative states. On the other position, pains and
fears may be attributed to animals, but not qualitatively, and in merely a
“non-first person" way. This suggests that they play a merely functional
role in explaining the behavior of the animal. I have similar difficulty with
Brandom’s distinction between sentience and sapience (e.g. Brandom 2002,
p. 93). The distinction suggests that animals enjoy a certain kind of cog-
nitive existence that includes sensory consciousness. But Brandom seems
altogether suspicious of sensory consciousness, eschewing talk of it in favor
of non-inferential observational reports (e.g. Brandom 1994, ch. 4). This may
suggest a sensory nihilist position.
15. Land 2006 and Land (Forthcoming) suggest an alternative interpretation,
according to which Kant only places conceptual conditions on the objective
awareness of rational beings (Land has also suggested in conversation that
this is McDowell’s view). Since rational beings must be able to think about
what is perceptually given, there are different conditions for such givenness
than there are for non-rational animals, who ex hypothesi cannot think. But
once it is conceded that animals have objective perceptual awareness despite
lacking higher intellectual capacities the generality of Kant’s argument in the
Transcendental Deduction concerning the role of the categories in experience
would seem to be threatened. Hence, I do not see Land’s proposal as a
genuine alternative between the options of objective awareness, sensory
solipsism, and sensory nihilism.
16. See Naragon 1990 and Ginsborg 2006 for discussion of this point.
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The question then is whether and to what extent animals can be
attributed with a sensory grasp of their environment. This resolves into
two parts; first, whether animals can be attributed with representations
of their environment; second, whether animals can be attributed with
conscious perceptual awareness of their environment. We’ll examine
the evidence for answering these questions in turn.
2. Representation and Varieties of Consciousness
If Kant is to credit animals with objective awareness then he must
attribute to them an even more basic capacity – viz. the capacity to
represent their environment. He clearly does this in late published
work – the 1790 Critique of the Power of Judgment. He says,
(1) Yet from the comparison of the similar mode of operation in animals
(the ground for which we cannot immediately perceive) to that of
humans (of which we are immediately aware) we can quite properly
infer in accordance with the analogy that animals also act in accor-
dance with representations [Vorstellungen] (and are not, as Descartes
would have it, machines), and that in spite of their specific difference,
they are still of the same genus as human beings (as living beings).
(CPJ 5:464).
This passage asserts Kant’s confidence in inferring that animals act in
accordance with representations just as humans do. Kant makes similar
remarks, across a wide span of years, in his logic, anthropology, and
metaphysics lectures.
(2) We call an animal alive because it has a faculty to alter its own state
as a consequence of its own representations. Someone who main-
tained that in animals the principle of life has no power of represen-
tation (vim repraesentativam), but rather that they act only according
to general laws of matter, was Descartes, and afterwards also Male-
branche, but to think of animals as machines is impossible, because
then one would deviate from all analogy with nature. . . (Metaphysik
Volckmann (1784–5) LM 28:449; cf. An 7:212).
(3) In regard to the objective content of our cognition in general, we
may think the following degrees, in accordance with which cognition
can, in this respect, be graded:
• The first degree of cognition is: to represent [vorstellen] some-
thing;
• The second: to represent something with consciousness, or
to perceive (percipere) [sich mit Bewußtsein etwas vorstellen oder
wahrnehmen];
• The third: to be acquainted with something (noscere), or to rep-
resent something in comparison with other things [etwas kennen
oder sich etwas in der Vergleichung mit anderen Dingen vorstellen],
both as to sameness and as to difference;
• The fourth: to be acquainted with something with consciousness,
i.e. to cognize it (cognoscere) [mit Bewußtsein etwas kennen, d.h.
erkennen]. Animals are acquainted with objects too, but they
do not cognize them [Die Thiere kennen auch Gegenstände, aber sie
erkennen sie nicht] (JL (1800) §X, 9:64–5; my emphasis; cf. Wiener
Logic (1780) LL 24:846).
Regardless of how one parses the different degrees of cognition outlined
in (3), it is clear that animals possess a degree of cognition higher than
that of mere representation. Hence, they must at least be capable of
representation. Kant also makes an important claim here that animals
are acquainted with objects [Gegenstände] not, as the solipsist version of
conceptualism would have it, merely with their own sensory states. So
Kant’s position seems not to be that animals are not aware of objects,
but rather that their awareness of such objects is importantly less
sophisticated than our own discursive awareness.
Kant also attributes conative states to animals, and suggests that it
is virtue of the combination of conative and representational states that
animals, much like humans, act on the world around them (An §80,
7:265–6).
However, in the Anthropology Kant talks about the obscurity of
representation in humans and animals.
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(4) The field of sensuous intuitions and sensations of which we are not
conscious, even though we can undoubtedly conclude that we have
them; that is, obscure representations in the human being (and thus
also in animals), is immense (An 7:135).
Obscure representations are representations attributable to a subject,
but of which the subject is not conscious (JL 9:33; An §5, 7:135–7). Often
this happens because there are too many other similar objects or events
to be represented (as is the case with hearing the many violins in an
orchestra), or when the representations are simply very weak or faint (as
is the case when one looks at the stars in the milky way, each of which
is individually difficult to point out but the aggregate of which generate
the perception of the milky way as a whole). One might be tempted
here towards the position that while much of the representation present
in humans is obscure, all animal representation is obscure, and thus
unconscious.
The difficulty with the interpretive position just described is that it
appears to conflict with Kant’s attribution of conscious representation to
animals in the Jäsche Logic (quote (3) above). If obscure representations
are unconscious representations then taking Kant’s remark in (4) as
suggesting that all animal representation is obscure directly conflicts
with his remark that animal representation includes perception – i.e. the
second grade of cognition, that of representation with consciousness (cf.
A320/B376–7).
One might attempt to avoid the problem by denying that the grada-
tions of consciousness that Kant discusses in quote (3) apply to both
animals and humans. After all, Kant does say he’s talking about “our”
cognition. So perhaps it is possible for an animal to have the first and
third degrees without the second (i.e. representation without conscious-
ness) even if it is not possible for humans. But this is unmotivated,
for Kant often speaks of sensibility as part of our “animal” nature (cf.
A546/B574, A802/B830; An 7:196). Further, Kant explicitly distinguishes
animals from humans only in the fourth “degree” (i.e. cognition), and
seems to do so specifically because the fourth degree builds on the
content of the third (i.e. acquaintance). This would be unnecessary if the
cognitive capacities of animals already departed at the second degree
from those of humans.
Fortunately, there are other ways around this apparent difficulty.
First, Kant’s discussion in the Anthropology does not clearly indicate
that animal representation is inherently obscure or unconscious, only
that the majority of representation in animals is obscure.
Second, Kant is clear that obscurity comes in degrees (JL 9:64; An
7:138–9). Hence it is compatible with an animal’s representational aware-
ness of objects being obscure that they are not totally obscure, and thus
not totally unconscious.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, it is not at all obvious what
sense of consciousness Kant denies to obscure representational aware-
ness. There are several different notion of consciousness in play in
current philosophical literature and it is not clear which one (or more)
of these senses Kant intends by his use of “consciousness” [Bewusstsein].
It does not appear plausible that Kant both attributes representa-
tions to animals and denies that they have what has been called in
contemporary philosophical discussion “access consciousness.” Access
consciousness requires that a psychological state be available to inter-
act with other states and, more generally, be available for use by the
organism.17 Kant’s attribution of representational capacities to animals
in the various passages above seems in clear accord with this idea.
Representations help an animal navigate its world and they couldn’t do
so if they were not consciously accessible in this sense. Both the sensory
solipsist and the sensory nihilist could grant this form of consciousness
to animals.
But there are three further notions of consciousness that Kant might
deny animals. The first is Nagel’s notion of “what it’s like” to be in
a particular conscious state.18 Call this “phenomenal” consciousness.
17. See Block 1995.
18. Nagel 1974.
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This need not be considered a form of objective awareness. The sensory
solipsist, but not the sensory nihilist, can accept that animals have this
form of consciousness.
Second, animals may be conscious in the sense of having a point of
view on the world. Call this “POV” consciousness.19 Attributing POV
consciousness to animals seems to be incompatible with the sensory
nihilist’s position, for according to the sensory nihilist, non-discursive
representation is simply a matter of causal co-variance and interac-
tion between an animal’s internal states and its environment. Such
co-variance is insufficient for the possession of a point of view.
It is less clear whether POV consciousness is incompatible with the
sensory solipsist position. Since the solipsist at least makes room for
the notion that there is something it is like to be an animal, this may
be suggestive of the animal’s also having a point of view. However, the
solipsist will deny that this is a point of view on an objective physical
world. Hence, to the extent that the sensory solipsist allows for a point
of view in non-discursive beings, it will only accommodate a merely
phenomenal or “what it is like” point of view.
Third, Kant might deny that animals are conscious in the sense of
having self-consciousness – viz. being able to self-ascribe their own mental
states. Denial of this form of consciousness seems prima facie compatible
with the attribution of POV or phenomenal consciousness to animals.
In contrast, being self-conscious entails having a point of view, for it
seems to require the capacity to represent one’s self as distinct from
other things, and of other things as relating to one’s self. Hence, sensory
nihilism is incompatible with the ascription of self-consciousness to
animals. It is less clear that self-consciousness entails phenomenal con-
sciousness since the occurrence and self-ascription of representational
19. Note that this is compatible with denying that there is a persisting subject
which has this point of view. Animal subjectivity may be wholly fragmentary,
consisting of temporally discrete points of view that are loosely held together
by associative mechanisms. Hence the notion of a point of view is not meant
to disbar the possibility of a Humean account of subjectivity.
states need not entail any accompanying phenomenology. However, the
sensory solipsist must deny self-consciousness for the simple reason
that it violates the solipsistic viewpoint. If a subject can self-ascribe,
then there are things distinct from it which it attributes to itself. This is
a straightforward denial of solipsism.
In what follows I will presume that Kant grants that animals possess
access consciousness. The question will be whether animals have any-
thing like phenomenal, POV, or self-consciousness. How we answer this
question will decide whether Kant subscribes to the sensory solipsist or
the sensory nihilist position.
3. Consciousness and Introspection
There are a variety of pre-critical texts where Kant appears to deny
to animals the capacity for consciousness of one kind or another. For
example, in a note to his 1762 essay on syllogistic forms he says,
(5) It is, indeed, of the greatest importance, when considering the nature
of animals, to take account of this. In observing them, we only
notice external actions; the differences between those actions are
indicative of the differing determinations of their appetites. It by no
means follows from this that there occurs within them that action
of the faculty of cognition in which they have an awareness of the
agreement or conflict between what is in one sensation and what
is in another, and hence that they judge in accordance with that
awareness (FS 2:60).
This text suggests that while animals have an awareness of sensation,
and thus presumably possess phenomenal consciousness, they lack
any awareness beyond this, and so lack a conscious point of view on
the objective world. Kant appears to express a similar view in the
mid–1770’s lecture notes that constitute Metaphysik L1. He says,
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(6) we ascribe to these beings a faculty of sensation, reproductive imagi-
nation, etc., but all only sensible as a lower faculty, and not connected
with consciousness (LM 28:277).
But in a late set of lectures – the Dohna lectures of 1792/3 – Kant appears
to reverse himself a bit concerning animal consciousness. He says,
(7) Consciousness is entirely lacking in animals, their actions happen
according to laws of the power of imagination, which nature placed
in them (LM 28:689–90).
The important phrase here is “entirely lacking.” The view expressed
here would seem to conflict with the attribution to animals, in passages
(5) and (6), of phenomenal consciousness. There are two prima facie
readings of (7). On the one hand, this text suggests that animals have
only access consciousness, and that this is necessary to explain their
actions. On the other hand, the appeal to a power of imagination
suggests that the animals have phenomenal consciousness as well,
since imaginings seem characteristically phenomenal in nature. It is
not clear to me that there is a decisive reason, within the text itself, for
favoring one interpretation or the other. For the sake of consistency
with the quotes (5) and (6) we may prefer the second reading. Certainly,
none of the texts are compatible with the attribution to animals of
self -consciousness since Kant tends to associate self-consciousness with
apperception and apperception with the understanding (e.g. B154), and
the presence of both apperception and self-consciousness in animals is
ruled out by (6) and perhaps (7) as well.
The broader question is whether we can square the position sug-
gested by (5) – (7) with the Vienna and Jäsche logics (see (3) above),
where Kant seems to indicate that animals are indeed conscious beings.
Fortunately, there are other texts that may yet shed light on which sense
of “consciousness” is at issue. For example, Kant attributes (at least the
possibility of) consciousness to animals, a few years earlier, in a 1789
letter to Marcus Herz.
(8) [representations] could still (I consider myself as an animal) carry on
their play in an orderly fashion, as connected according to empirical
laws of association, and thus they could even have influence on my
feeling and desire, without my being aware of my own existence
[meines Daseins unbewußt] (assuming that I am even conscious of
each individual presentation, but not of their relation to the unity of
presentation of their object, by means of the synthetic unity of their
apperception) [gesezt das ich auch jeder einzelnen Vorstellung bewusst
wäre, aber nicht der Beziehung derselben auf die Einheit der Vorstellung
ihres Objects, vermittelst der synthetischen Einheit ihrer Apperception].
This might be so without my cognizing the slightest thing thereby,
not even what my own condition [Zustand] is (BW 11:52, May 26,
1789).
Kant seems to be suggesting here that we can attribute a consciousness
of individual representations (or of their objects – the representeds)
to animals. What animals lack, according to the letter, is the ability to
attribute those representations – qua representations – to a unified subject.
This is supported by a remark he makes earlier in the same letter that,
(9) In other words I ascribe to the understanding the synthetic unity
of apperception, through which alone the manifold of intuition (of
whose every element I may nevertheless be particularly conscious
[deren jedes ich mir besonders immerhin bewusst sein mag]) in a unified
consciousness, is brought to the representation of an object in general
(whose concept is then determined by means of that manifold) (C
11:50).
What I suggest is that Kant here allows for an awareness of individual
representations (or of their content) but does not allow awareness of this
awareness. In quote (9) we see Kant’s drawing of a distinction between
consciousness of a relation between oneself and one’s representations
(i.e. self-consciousness) and consciousness of the elements of one’s
intuitive representation (whether construed as an act of representation
or as a represented object). In fact, this is suggested even in some of
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the earlier texts. For example, in the Pölitz lectures from the mid–1770’s
Kant says,
(10) Animals are accordingly different from human souls not in degree
but rather in species; for however much animal souls increase in their
sensible faculties, consciousness of their self, inner sense, still cannot
be attained thereby. Even though they have better phenomena in
sensibility than we do, they still lack inner sense. . . Now we can think
problematically that such beings exist which have no inner sense,
for it is no contradiction to suppose such. How many phenomena
can be explained, without assuming an inner sense, from the faculty
of outer sensibility in such beings that have no inner sense? The
consciousness of one’s self, the concept of the I, does not occur with
such beings that have no inner sense; accordingly no non-rational
animal can think: I am. . . (LM 28:276).
Again we see the compatibility (if not outright agreement – given that
animals have “better phenomena in sensibility" than we do) of what
Kant says with the possession of phenomenal and POV consciousness
in animals, but the incompatibility of animal self-consciousness. The
problem is that Kant is not denying just consciousness to animals here –
he’s denying them inner sense.
The denial of inner sense raises a problem. If animals are without
inner sense then they cannot be aware of anything as being in time
since Kant believes that the temporal properties of all things (including
mere sensory states) are derived from the fact that time is the form
and ground of inner sense, and all things of which the mind is aware
must ultimately be represented in inner sense (A34/B50–51).20 It seems
scarcely credible to attribute conscious awareness of any sort to animals
when that awareness is not temporally structured.
A possible explanation for the denial of inner sense to animals is that
Kant has not yet, in the 1770’s, explicitly distinguished the notion of
20. Kant held that time was ideal and the form of inner sense even before CPR,
in the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770.
inner sense from that of apperception. However, if we do so distinguish
these two ideas, then Kant’s denial that animals have inner sense is
better understood as the denial of an animal’s ability to apperceive
(i.e. have consciousness of one’s self conceptualized as ‘I’) than it is a
denial of their lack of consciousness of their representational states in
time. This explanation is attractive because it safeguards what is most
important to Kant – viz. the denial that animals have any awareness of
a self-as-‘I’. This is a theme he would return to later, in his Anthropology.
There Kant distinguishes humans from other animals in virtue of the
human capacity to represent an “I” (An 7:127).
Thus, Kant’s denial of consciousness to animals in (10), I argue,
extends only to the denial of self-consciousness (i.e. the representation
of an ‘I’) rather than the denial of POV or phenomenal consciousness.
Indeed, depending on what Kant means by saying animals have “better
phenomena in sensibility than we do” we might also attribute to him
an endorsement of POV consciousness in animals.
Hence, in denying animals the capacity for self-consciousness Kant
may only be denying the much more cognitively sophisticated ability
to unify disparate states of mind in the ascription to one subject (the ‘I’)
whose states they are.
There remains a worry concerning Kant’s expressed views regarding
consciousness, apperception and inner sense. We might grant that Kant
allows that animals possess a variety of forms of consciousness, so
long as these are distinguished from apperceptive self-consciousness,
but this would seem to require granting animals the capacity for inner
sense. Granting animals an inner sense means granting them inner
intuitions. But does Kant really allow animals intuitive awareness?
Intuition suggests a cognitive relation to an object (A19/B33; A20/B34;
A108–9; A320/B376–7). We’ve seen reasons for thinking that he must
allow them inner intuitions – viz. temporally ordered representational
states. But if animals have inner intuitions then aren’t they aware of
themselves, and so self-conscious? Moreover, if animals have inner
intuitions might they not also have outer? In the next section I argue
that attributing to animals the capacity for both forms of inner and
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outer intuition, and thus genuine spatio-temporal conscious awareness,
does not require attributing to animals self-consciousness.
4. Animal Consciousness, Intuition, and Objective Perception
I have suggested that Kant, in his pre-critical work, does not seem to
have clearly distinguished between inner sense and apperception.21
For example, in the previously cited Four Syllogisms essay of 1762 Kant
speculates that the difference between animals and humans depends
on the presence in humans of inner sense.
(11) This consideration may induce us to think more carefully about
the essential difference between animals endowed with reason and
those not so endowed. If one succeeds in understanding what the
mysterious power is which makes judging possible, one will have
solved the problem. My present opinion tends to the view that this
power or capacity is nothing other than the faculty of inner sense,
that is to say, the faculty of making one’s own representations the
objects of one’s thought. This faculty cannot be derived from some
other faculty. It is, in the strict sense of the term, a fundamental
faculty which, in my opinion, can only belong to rational beings.
But it is upon this faculty that the entire higher faculty of cognition
is based (FS 2:60; my emphasis).
Here inner sense is explicitly tied to the capacity to take one’s own
representations as the objects of thought.22 But this is ambiguous be-
tween (at least) the capacity to self-ascribe representations, and the
capacity to be aware of one’s own modifications. The former seems a
much more cognitively sophisticated capacity than the latter, and in
fact seems to presuppose it. Moreover, the capacity for self-ascription
seems to fit neatly with the notion of apperception, while the capacity
21. For a discussion of the details of Kant’s progress towards the distinction
between inner sense and apperception see Ameriks 1982/2000b, ch. 7.
22. Compare Kant’s remark that “Consciousness is really a representation that
another representation is in me” (JL 9:33).
for awareness of one’s own modifications seems better suited to inner
sense. This is borne out, at least to some degree by Kant’s distinction,
in the first Critique, between inner sense and apperception. Kant clearly
indicates that apperception is the source of all combination present in
a manifold of intuition while inner sense is merely a form of intuition
and contains no combination or (conceptually) determinate intuition
within itself (B154). But this distinction between intuition as determined
by apperception and the form of an intuition does not mean that ap-
perception is the origin of inner sense as temporal form.23 If it did,
the argument of the Transcendental Aesthetic concerning the intuitive,
as opposed to conceptual, nature of time would be otiose. Kant con-
siders time the form of inner sense and, qua intuition, time must be
that which “precedes all thought” (B132). So a temporal order to one’s
representations must be able to precede a conceptual determination of
those same representations.24
If we attribute inner sense to animals, which includes attributing a
temporal order to the animal’s representations, and thus what seems
the minimal capacity required for a subject to become aware of its own
modifications, this need not run afoul of Kant’s concerns as expressed
in his pre-critical writings.25 The attribution to animals of temporally
23. Note though that Kant does say that the concept of magnitude is involved
in the “generation [Erzeugung] of time itself.” (A145/B184). However, I
take it that this remark is compatible with thinking that inner sense, as
temporal form, precedes any conceptual determination. So the idea is that,
pre-categorically, consciousness is still temporally structured, but there is
no consciousness of any content as having determinate temporal structure
without the concept of magnitude. Thanks to Thomas Land for discussion
of this point.
24. See Ameriks 1982/2000b, p. 253 for a similar argument.
25. Note, once again, that the attribution to animals of inner sense does not
require an attribution of a substantial mental subject, or even of a persisting
subject. Inner sense, as a cognitive capacity, requires at minimum the capacity
to represent one’s representations in a temporally ordered way. But it does
not entail that the representations need be united or associated in anything
more than Hume’s “bundle” sense.
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ordered representational states, some of which are phenomenally con-
scious, does not in any way entail that the animal is cognizant of one
state as preceding or succeeding another. It merely means that in the
flux of the animal’s representations, the states do precede and succeed
one another, and animals are sensitive to objects being presented in
succession. In slogan form: a temporal order of consciousness does not
entail cognition of a presented temporal order. Thus animals can have
inner intuitions (i.e. temporally ordered representations) without the
unification of those inner intuitions by a subject of experience which
represents them as being so ordered.
Thus, when Kant denies inner sense or consciousness to animals,
it seems plausible to understand him as speaking very narrowly. He
is not denying that they have representations ordered according to
the form of inner intuition – time. Hence, in describing what it might
be like to be a bat, Kant’s position could coherently take different
conscious states of the bat as preceding or succeeding one another,
and thus as compatible with the bat’s being phenomenally conscious.
Indeed, on this interpretation it is completely plausible that the bat
(or, more generally, any animal) has POV consciousness. What animals
lack, according to Kant, is a higher-order cognitive capacity both to
reflect on features of their representations (qua representational acts
or vehicles) and to unify disparate representational states in an act of
self-ascription. They, in contrast to discursive beings, have only the
fragmented, fluctuating consciousness characteristic of, for example,
Humean bundles, while discursive beings have the power to unite the
elements of these bundles in a less fragmented, more logically coherent
fashion. But their subjective existence as Humean bundles need not
entail that they lack phenomenal consciousness or a point of view on
the physical world.26 Their points of view may be fragmentary, but they
26. Note that it need not entail such a view, at least prima facie. Depending on how
one interprets Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Analytic, particularly
in the Deduction, there may be reason to foreclose this possibility. Here I
am most concerned with whether any of Kant’s specific remarks concerning
are still viewpoints on the world. So we might distinguish two senses
of “inner sense” – a narrow and a broad. The narrow sense corresponds
to the higher-order cognitive capacity of apperception which allows for
consciousness of temporal order, while the broad sense corresponds
merely to the capacity for temporally-ordered consciousness.
One can also see why Kant might often have failed, even in the later
critical works, to make explicit the distinction between the broad and
narrow notions of inner sense. For, in denying to animals the capacity
to reflect on features of their representations or unify representations
in acts of self-ascription, he is essentially denying them capacities
associated with introspection, and Kant associates introspection closely
with inner sense.27 Kant sees animal consciousness as virtually bereft
of introspective character, and thus limited to awareness of the world
external to the animal.28
Kant’s denial of introspective capacities to animals is nevertheless
compatible with an animal’s being capable of acting in accord with
its inner states (e.g. pain , hunger, thirst, etc.).29 On this interpretation,
there is no reason why Kant would need to deny that animals are
phenomenally conscious of their inner states. What animals clearly
lack is the capacity for self-consciousness – viz. the capacity for both
higher-order representational states, and the capacity for self-ascriptive
acts utilizing those states.30
animals commit him to a conceptualist position.
27. For discussion see Ameriks 1982/2000b, ch. 7; Powell 1990, especially ch. 6.
28. In the metaphysics lectures Kant speaks of animals as merely possessing
outer sense to the exclusion of inner sense. See, e.g. Metaphysik L1, LM 28:276.
29. This seems supported by Kant remarks in the Anthropology where he distin-
guishes awareness of pleasure and displeasure from inner sense. He calls
the former “interior sense” (sensus interior). See An §15, 7:153.
30. So, pace McDowell, animals may be consciously aware of their pains, etc.,
while lacking the ability to self-ascribe such states (e.g. As in "I am in
pain"). This has important ramifications for understanding the relation
between self-ascription and behavior, for animals clearly manifest pain-
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If one does not properly distinguish self-consciousness from other
forms of consciousness one can see how a denial of self-consciousness
may lead to denials of other forms as well. Because of the link between
self-consciousness and introspection, denying self-consciousness to
animals may lead to the denial of any inner awareness at all. On
any model that privileges inner awareness over outer awareness (not
necessarily Kant’s model), the denial of inner awareness amounts to a
denial that there is any conscious awareness whatsoever. Unfortunately,
it is easy to slide from the denial of introspective capacities on the part
of a conscious subject to examine their own states, to the denial that
the subject has any conscious states whatsoever. While I don’t believe
Kant was guilty of such a slide, at least by the time of his critical period,
his writings can seem to suggest it, and subsequent interpreters have
reinforced the tendency.31
There remains the question whether animals have POV conscious-
ness, either of the “inner” or of the “outer” physical world. One might
concede that Kant thought animals have the capacity for access and phe-
nomenal consciousness, and even that they have inner intuitions in the
“broad” sense that allows for temporally ordered representations. But
why should we think that Kant conceded to animals consciousness of
anything beyond their sensory states? That is, why attribute to animals
avoiding behavior, which suggests that self ascription is not necessary for
the behavioral efficacy of such mental states. Nevertheless, this conclusion
is compatible with thinking that self-ascription plays an important role in
shaping a variety of other kinds of behavior.
31. This tendency is present in Kitcher 1984, 1990, though Kitcher understands
the notion of apperception to be one concerning personal identity rather
than a form of self-consciousness. For criticism of this slide see Allison 1996,
ch. 4. Ameriks 1982/2000b is a notable exception to this tendency. Brook 1994
makes a similar distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness as
I do here. However, Brook’s otherwise laudable discussion suggests a ten-
dency to make a different but equally problematic slide between awareness
of the vehicle of representation and awareness of the content of that vehicle
– e.g. see his definition of a representational state at p. 52. Brook’s discussion
emphasizes the awareness of representational vehicles whereas Kant, I have
argued, emphasizes the awareness of representational contents.
a consciousness of their environment rather than a consciousness of
their sensations that permits successful navigation of their environment
without actually perceiving that environment? Recall the two options
the conceptualist has for explaining animal awareness. On the first
option, sensory solipsism, the animal is conscious merely of its own sen-
sory states, but lacking concepts, cannot be aware of anything distinct
from those states. Effectively, the animal has a point of view, but only on
its own states. On the second option, sensory nihilism, the animal lacks
phenomenal consciousness and thus even the consciousness required
for a minimal point of view. According to this second option there is
no phenomenal consciousness, but rather merely access consciousness
– i.e states which interact with one another to account for the animals’
skillful navigation of its environment.
The objection we are now considering is, in essence, that I have only
shown that Kant does not take the second of the two options regarding
animal consciousness. Kant thus allows that animals have phenomenal
consciousness. But this merely demonstrates that Kant is a sensory
solipsist rather than a sensory nihilist concerning animal consciousness.
Animals are aware merely of their own states, their own sensations.
They are phenomenally but not objectively aware.
As an interpretation of Kant, the first option faces a number of
difficulties. First, Kant’s discussion of the forms of intuition (i.e. space
and time) does not suggest that one form might be had independently
of the another, in fact he seems to suggest that they must come as a
package.32 For example, Kant argues that time is the “a priori condition
32. It is this dependency relation that Kant emphasizes when he says in Meta-
physik K2 (1790s) that, “I would have no inner sense if I had no outer sense”
(LM 28:771). There is also the argument of the Refutation of Idealism to
consider. Kant is there concerned to show that the consciousness of one’s
own existence is “simultaneously the immediate consciousness of the ex-
istence [Daseins] of other things outside or external [außer]” to one (B276).
Exactly how Kant argues for this claim is controversial. As an anonymous
referee points out, Kant’s argument in the Refutation seems to proceed from
a claim concerning the role of the category of substance in determination
of a subjective temporal order (e.g. B278). While this might suggest the
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of all appearance in general” (A34/B50–1). Hence it cannot be the case
that animals are aware of outer appearances without those appearances
being temporal, and thus modifications of inner sense.33
Second, in the Anthropology Kant explicitly says that our sensory
awareness is outward and object-directed, and that we only become
aware of our sensations, or their origins in our sense organs, in cases
where the intensity of the sensation is particularly extreme.
(12) These three outer senses [i.e. sight, touch, and hearing] lead the
subject through reflection to cognition of the object as a thing outside
him. But if the sensation becomes so strong that the consciousness of
the movement of the organ becomes stronger than the consciousness
of the relation to an external object, then external representations are
changed into internal ones. To notice smoothness or roughness in
what can be touched is something entirely different from inquiring
about the figure of the external body through touching. So too, when
the speech of another is so loud that, as we say, the ears hurt from it,
or when someone who steps from a dark room into bright sunshine
argument’s irrelevance to a discussion of non-discusive beings who cannot
employ such categories, it is important to appreciate that, for Kant, the
relevant object of consciousness is the existence of a thing and this conscious-
ness is immediate. These are paradigmatic features of intuitive rather than
conceptual awareness (cf. A320/B376–7, A371, A600–1/B628–9; JL 9:91). So
Kant’s point seems to be that intuitive consciousness of oneself is at the
same time intuitive consciousness of some distinct existence outside one.
This further demonstrates Kant’s commitment to a dependence relation
between temporal intuition and spatial intuition, or inner and outer sense,
even if the argument for this conclusion proceeds by way of an appeal to
conceptual capacities. I make no claims here regarding the success of Kant’s
argument, merely that his intention was to show that inner intuition was
not independent of outer intuition.
33. Perhaps a subject could have many inner intuitions but just one outer
intuition? Kant seems to suggest that this might be possible as long as
the one outer intuition presented sufficient material for the imagination to
generate subsequent inner sensory images. Adjudicating this issue is better
left to a discussion of skepticism. For our purposes, the important point is
that, even in the extreme skeptical case, there must be outer intuition if there
is to be any inner intuition.
blinks his eyes. . . both persons are unable to find a concept of the
object because of the intensity of the sensations; their attention is
fixed merely on the subjective representation, namely the change of
the organ (An §19, 7:156–7).
One might be doubtful of the applicability of this passage to the ques-
tion concerning animal consciousness given that Kant is here talking
about conceptualizing objects and cognizing them thereby. However, the
main point of the passage seems independent of these issues concern-
ing conceptualization and cognition. For Kant seems to be arguing the
point that what one is primarily aware of via the three sense modalities
discussed here is an object, not a sensation (or any other representa-
tional vehicle). Sensations are thus merely the vehicles for a subject’s
awareness, they are not, at least in normal cases, the object of such
awareness. But if this is the correct way of understanding Kant here,
then it becomes difficult to understand why a merely causal interme-
diary (the sensory vehicle) in the human case is itself the object of
awareness in the animal case. This is all the more true given that, as
we’ve seen, Kant thinks that awareness of one’s own representational
vehicles (i.e. sensations), because it requires introspection, is a more
sophisticated cognitive capacity than awareness of the external objects
that are the contents of those vehicles.
If what I have said thus far is correct then animal consciousness
should be understood to include the capacity for both outer and inner
(in the broad sense) intuition. Since Kant defines intuition as the sin-
gular and immediate representation of an object, the fact than animals
are capable of intuition suggests they are capable of genuine objective
awareness of their environment rather than mere subjective awareness
of their sensory states. This means that in addition to access and phe-
nomenal forms of consciousness, Kant’s account is compatible with
the possibility of an animal’s having POV consciousness of elements
of the physical world. Hence, contra the conceptualist interpretation,
Kant’s view of animal consciousness does not require denying to ani-
mals the capacity for objective perceptual awareness of physical objects.
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Hence it is compatible with Kant’s views on animal consciousness that
objects present themselves to the consciousness of animals as, at the
least, colored, bounded regions of space, the presentations of which
succeed one another in time. Animals are primarily aware of objects
and their features, rather than sensations or other representational vehi-
cles. The relation of an animal’s representations to one another follows
according to associative regularities governing the animal’s faculty of
imagination.34
At this point, the possibility of Kant’s recognition of objective percep-
tual consciousness in animals, or more generally, of objective awareness
without conceptualization, may still seem dubious to some as a genuine
interpretive option. For many interpreters the largest stumbling block
must be the argument presented in the Transcendental Deduction of
the first Critique. It is there that Kant seems most clearly to articulate
the conditions for the possibility of objective perceptual awareness as
requiring the applicability of pure concepts of the understanding – the
categories. If this were indeed Kant’s strategy then we would have
to regard as hopeless the attribution to Kant of the idea that animals
are objectively perceptually aware of the world around them.35 Here,
though, I hope to have shown both that Kant’s claims concerning animal
representation and consciousness do not themselves necessitate against
attributing to animals the capacity for objective perceptual awareness,
and that a consistent interpretation of Kant’s position concerning ani-
mals (and non-discursive beings more broadly) can actively endorse this
attribution.36
34. See, e.g., A112, A116, A121, B142, B152; Metaphysik Dohna, LM 28:698–90.
35. Though see Allais 2009; Hanna 2005, 2007 for discussion of how a non-
conceptualist interpretation might deal with this issue.
36. Thanks to Andrew Chignell, Michelle Kosch, Thomas Land, and Derk Pere-
boom for discussion of various aspects of this paper.
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